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We consider the class of reference frame independent protocols in d dimensions for
quantum key distribution, in which Alice and Bob have one natural basis that is aligned
and the rest of their measurement bases are unaligned. We relate existing approaches to
tomographically complete protocols. We comment on two different approaches to finite
key bounds in this setting, one direct and one using the entropic uncertainty relation
and suggest that the existing finite key bounds can still be improved.
Keywords: quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution, reference frame indepen-
dent, uncertainty relations.
1. Introduction
QKD protocols such as BB842, and six-state4, as they are defined in the literature,
require the alignment of Alice and Bob’s local measurement frames: XA = XB = X,
YA = YB = Y and ZA = ZB = Z where X,Y, Z stand for the Pauli operators
σX , σY , σZ . It has been known for some time that alignment can be dispensed
with, if one is ready to change the physical implementation of the qubit 6,18,1;
but these schemes require complex quantum states and are considered impractical.
More recently, it was shown that reference frame independence can be achieved
by changing the protocol9, while keeping the same physical implementation. The
main idea in the reference frame independent (rfi) protocol is that Alice and Bob
share a common well-aligned measurement basis Z = ZA = ZB (which is naturally
available in many practical implementations a), while the other measurements can
be misaligned by an arbitrary but fixed angle β
XB = cosβXA + sinβYA, YB = cosβYA − sinβXA. (1)
aConsider for examples, the time basis in a time bin implementation, the circular polarization
basis, or the basis of different paths.
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Since the “natural basis” is automatically aligned, we have access to the quantum
bit error rate in the Z basis,
Q = Pr(error) = Pr(a 6=b) = 1− 〈Z ⊗ Z〉
2
. (2)
However, we also require additional information, namely the parameter C, in order
to bound Eve’s information.
2. The parameter C
The original rfi protocol introduced the β-independent parameter C,
C = 〈XA ⊗XB〉2 + 〈XA ⊗ YB〉2 + 〈YA ⊗XB〉2 + 〈YA ⊗ YB〉2, (3)
which is an entanglement witness (C ≤ 1 for separable states and C = 2 for
maximally entangled states) to bound Eve’s information.
We note that the protocol can be generalized to qudits in the following manner.
Denoting {|0〉 , |1〉 , ..., |d− 1〉} the computational basis vector of the Hilbert space
describing a qudit, it is well known that the Pauli operators admit a generalization
to higher dimension known as the Weyl operators, which are unitary operators of
the form XkZ` for k, ` ∈ {0, 1, ..., d− 1} and
Z =
d−1∑
j=0
ωj |j〉 〈j| , X =
d−1∑
j=0
|j + 1〉 〈j| , (4)
where ω = e2pii/d are the roots of unity and j + 1 denotes the sum modulo d.
To accommodate relative unitary rotation around Z, let XA = UXU
† and XB =
V XV † where [U,Z] = [V,Z] = 0. In the protocol, Alice and Bob perform the
projective measurements on the eigenstates of Xk1A Z
`1 and Xk2B Z
`2 and from the
statistics estimate Q and
C =
d−1∑
k1,k2=1
`1,`2=0
|〈Xk1A Z`1 ⊗Xk2B Z`2〉|2 (5)
to bound Eve’s information. In the appendix we prove that (5) is a generalization
of (3) with all the desired properties: it is independent of the local unitaries U and
V mentioned above and is an entanglement witness (C ≤ (d − 1)2 for separable
states and C = d(d− 1) for maximally entangled states).
3. The tomographic approach
The way measurement results are used in the rfi protocol and its generalized ver-
sion is not optimal, in the sense that the tomographic information deducible from
the measurement statistics can be used directly, instead of via the parameter C.
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Estimating C requires the knowledge of [d(d− 1)]2 correlators 〈Xk1A Z`1 ⊗Xk2B Z`2〉
which can alternatively also be used to completely specify the state as12
ρAB =
1
d2
d−1∑
k1,k2,`1,`2=0
〈Xk1A Z`1 ⊗Xk2B Z`2〉Xk1A Z`1 ⊗Xk2B Z`2 (6)
in the measurement bases of Alice {Xk1A Z`1} and Bob {Xk1B Z`1}. However, working
only from C discards some information that can lead to a tighter bound on Eve’s
information. Using tomography, one can have a rfi protocol without the need for
C10.
Let us explain in detail how that is possible. The most direct approach is to
make d2 measurements XkZ` on each subsystem (Alice has one, Bob the other) and
combine the measurement outcomes to find each correlator directly. This is very
inefficient because it requires d2 different estimates to be made with good precision,
which requires many copies of the state. (Recall that collective attacks are the
optimal attack in general for Eve in this scenario 8,15.) Also it is unnecessary because
many of the Weyl operators have the same set of eigenvectors (Z` for ` = 0, ..., d−1
for instance); hence the measurement statistics of one can be used to calculate the
average values of all the others. In general, the minimum number of measurements
needed to completely specify the state is still unknown. However, if d is prime,
one can reconstruct the state by making only d + 1 measurements corresponding
to d + 1 mutually unbiased bases on each subsystem, say B = {Z,XZ` : ` =
0, ..., d − 1}. After the measurements, Alice and Bob can estimate their marginal
probability distribution locally, and if they share the measurement outcomes, the
joint probability distribution p(a, b|A ⊗ B) where A,B ∈ B. It is well known that
the eigenbasis of any XkZ` is among the eigenbases of observables in B; therefore
from p(a, b|A⊗B) we can compute all the average values using
〈Xk1A Z`1 ⊗Xk2B Z`2〉 =
∑
a,b
λaλbp(a, b|A⊗B), (7)
where λa is the eigenvalue associated to the eigenvector representing outcome a of
Xk1A Z
`1 and A is the operator in B with the same eigenbasis as Xk1A , ditto for Bob.
Hence a full state reconstruction is possible by (6).
Once ρAB is found relative to the (partially) unaligned frames, it is possible to
find local rotations UA, UB such that UA ⊗ UBρABU†A ⊗ U†B = ρ˜AB where ρ˜AB is
a diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues of ρAB . This procedure is always possible if
Alice and Bob’s marginals are random, and if this is not the case, Alice and Bob
can do the randomization themselves. Then ρ˜AB is a mixture of d-dimensional Bell
states (maximally entangled states) in the new bases effected by the local rotations.
Using the eigenvalues, λ, of this state, the asymptotic rate will be17
r∞ = log d−H(λ), (8)
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and the finite key bounds can also be calculated from those methods to give,
rN =
n
N
(
min
E|P±µ
H(A|E)− leakEC/n− 2
n
log
1
PA
− (2 log d+ 3)
√
log(2/¯)
n
)
,
(9)
where the security parameter is  = EC+PA+nPEPE+¯, and EC is the probability
of failure of the error correction step, PA the probability of failure of the privacy
amplification, PE is the probability that the estimate of any measured parameter P
is outside a tolerated range µ. The minimization of H(A|E) is done over all attacks
of Eve, denoted by E, compatible with observed parameters P within tolerated
fluctuations µ.
We also note that doing tomography it is possible to relax the assumption of the
“natural basis”, allowing Alice and Bob to have one axis which they know is close
to being aligned but is not perfectly aligned. This will lead to an increase in the
error rate Q. For example, for the case d = 2 the Z axes must not differ by more
than 41.5◦ for Q to be small enough to have any hope of generating the shared
randomness required to grow a secret key. However, it is a natural assumption in
many settings to take one basis to be aligned.
4. Bounds from Uncertainty Relations
Recently, a tighter finite-key bound for the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol2
has been found by Tomamichel et. al. 19. For some time there has been the idea of
viewing the security of QKD as reducing to suitable URs. After a series of works
7,13,3, this program was brought to completion by Tomamichel and Renner 20, who
indeed provided a UR involving the quantity that captures Eve’s uncertainty in
QKD: the smooth min-entropy conditional on a quantum observer. The result is
directly applicable to finite-key bounds19.
We can also use this approach instead of the tomographic approach described
above to obtain a security bound for the rfi protocols. That is possible by using the
complete knowledge of the eigenvalues λ to infer the max-entropy in the virtual
bases corresponding to the local rotations that optimized Alice and Bob’s correla-
tions.
The UR lower bounds Eve’s uncertainty on the key,
H ¯min(Z|E) +H ¯max(X|B) ≥ log
1
c
, (10)
where c quantifies the ‘incompatibility’ between the measurements Z = Z⊗n and
X = X⊗n. Moreover, as any decent measure of uncertainty, Hmax can only increase
under information processing and in particular under Bob’s measurement 11, so
H ¯max(X|B) ≤ H ¯max(X|X′) (11)
where the measurement X′ = X ′⊗n is made on system B. Now comes the crucial
insight for what follows: the protocol does not have to prescribe the actual mea-
surement of X and X′. Given the observed parameters, we are free to imagine the
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measurement X′ on Bob’s side that makes his uncertainty as small as possible on
a hypothetical measurement X. The data required for this is easily found once the
state is reconstructed from the tomographic data.
Let X and X ′ be observables mutually unbiased to Z with outcomes in dimen-
sion d corresponding to measurements on Alice and Bob respectively, whence the
right hand side of (10) reduces to n log d. Using a bound for H ¯max found using an
extension of the method of 19,
H ¯max(X|X′) ≤ nH(vX⊗X′(µ)), (12)
finally we have to maximize H (vX⊗X′(µ)), where vX⊗X′(µ) is the vector of prob-
abilities of the different outcomes (the parameters P) in this virtual basis, up to a
finite sampling uncertainty µ. In this way, we have been conservative in giving Eve
maximum information on the key, compatible with our observed data. The finite
key rate reads therefore
rN ≤ n
N
(
log d−H(vX⊗X′(µ))− leakEC/n− 2
n
log
1
2(PA − ¯)
)
. (13)
We can maximize this value over the trade-off between the signals devoted to the
key and those devoted to parameter estimation, as well as over the choices of PE
and PA compatible with sec for given EC and now ¯ is a function of PE.
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Fig. 1. Finite key rate rN as a function of the number of signals N for the dimensions d = 2
and 3 computed via uncertainty relation using equation (13) and tomographic approach using
equation (9). The plots are for sec = 10−10, EC = 10−20 and Q = 1%.
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5. Conclusions
The derivation of the UR is generic: it is not linked to BB84, nor to QKD for that
matter. Still, one may surmise that, in the context of QKD, such a UR is of prac-
tical use only for two-measurement protocols like BB84 and its higher-dimensional
generalizations 5,17. When it comes to the six-state protocol, which uses three mea-
surements, the UR yields the same bound as for BB84, while a better bound is found
by taking into account the detailed structure of the states 16. In fact, in considering
the rfi protocol, for which the bound described in the previous section with d = 2
is equivalent to the bound for the six-state protocol, the asymptotic bound for the
secret key is indeed worse using the UR technique. However, the critical number
of signals at which the secret key rate becomes positive is reduced using the UR
approach (see Figure 1). This suggests that there should exist a better technique for
constructing the finite-key bounds that gives the best of both methods, probably
by eliminating the need for the smoothing correction term given in section 3.3.4 of
Renner’s thesis14.
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Appendix.
The essential ingredients in the proof that equation (5) generalizes C are twofold:
(i) the relation between average values of operators and the Hilbert-Schmidt inner
product, namely 〈O〉ρ = 〈ρ,O〉 where 〈·, ·〉 is the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product de-
fined as 〈A,B〉 = Tr(A†B), and (ii) the Weyl operators as an orthonormal basis up
to normalization, i.e. 〈Xk1Z`1 , Xk2Z`2〉 = dδk1,k2δ`1,`2 . We recall the computation
of inner product using an orthonormal basis
〈ρ, ρ〉 = 1
d
d−1∑
k,`=0
〈ρ,XkZ`〉〈XkZ`, ρ〉 = 1
d
d−1∑
k,`=0
|〈ρ,XkZ`〉|2. (14)
To prove that C is invariant with respect to rotations around Z, first note that
C can be rewritten as
C =
d−1∑
k1,k2=0
`1,`2=0
|〈Xk1A Z`1 ⊗Xk2B Z`2〉|2 −
d−1∑
k2,`2=0
`1=0
|〈Z`1 ⊗Xk2B Z`2〉|2
−
d−1∑
k1,`1=0
`2=0
|〈Xk1A Z`1 ⊗ Z`2〉|2 +
d−1∑
`1,`2=0
|〈Z`1 ⊗ Z`2〉|2 (15)
Tomographic Quantum Cryptography Protocols are Reference Frame Independent 7
where the first sum simplifies to d2 Tr(ρ2AB). We can switch bases from X
k2
B Z
l2
to Xk2Zl2 since they are both bases for L(Cd), thus invariant, and similarly for
the third sum. The final term is obviously invariant with respect to Z rotations.
Therefore, we have proved that C is independent of the local unitaries U and V
commuting with Z.
To show that C acts as an entanglement witness, consider the product state
ρAB = σA ⊗ σB for which C factorizes into
C =
d−1∑
k1=1
`1=0
|〈Xk1A Z`1〉σA |2
d−1∑
k2=1
`2=0
|〈Xk2B Z`2〉σB |2 (16)
and note that
d−1∑
k1=1
`1=0
|〈Xk1A Z`1〉σA |2 = dTr(σ2A)− 1−
d−1∑
`1=1
|〈Z`1〉σA |2 ≤ d− 1, (17)
from which C ≤ (d−1)2 for all product states and moreover for all separable states
by convexity. Thus if C > (d−1)2 for a particular state, then the state is entangled,
however, the converse, that the state is separable for C less than that value, is not
implied. Indeed entangled states can have C < (d− 1)2.
Note that C is a sum over tensor products of operators that do not commute
with Z, the raw key basis. The maximum value of C is only achieved for maximally
entangled states. The maximum value that can be obtained with a separable state is
(d−1)2, therefore there is a gap between separable states and maximally entangled
states that scales linearly with d.
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